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Thinking ahead for Europe 
Yes, he can 
Andrea Renda 
14 November 2016 
o it happened. Buckle up. Donald Trump will be the 45th President of the (not so) United 
States of America. No one would have believed it just a few weeks ago, and at the time 
of writing, just a few days after the vote, thousands of people are vehemently protesting 
in the streets to express their opposition to the personal history, stated values and proposed 
agenda of the newly elected president. Terms like “apocalypse” are being used by 
commentators (and were used by Hillary Clinton before the vote1) to define what happened, 
and even more fears are being spread on what happens next. But the ballot is cast, or – as Julius 
Caesar famously said when crossing the Rubicon in 49 BC – alea iacta est: like it or not, the next 
four years will be Trump years, and it is time to reflect on what this could imply for the United 
States and the rest of the world, including of course Europe. This is not only a useful exercise 
for us in forecasting (there seems to be strong need to improve on that side too), but also to 
trigger a first reflection on what academics, experts, intellectuals in the US and the rest of the 
world should do during the next few years to promote a fruitful, high quality, evidence-based 
policy debate.  
On the home front: Guns, coal and steel 
A common refrain is that mainstream media took Trump “literally, but not seriously”; whereas 
his electors took him “seriously, but not literally”.2 If this is true, it might be wise to assume 
that not all the pre-electoral announcements will become concrete reform plans, and most 
likely the President-elect will not seek to put Hillary Clinton to jail, or to build a wall on the 
US southern border. Still, the new administration will likely pursue a partial ‘erase and 
rewind’ strategy, in the attempt to bring US regulatory policy back to the pre-Obama era.3  
For example, the new administration, also thanks to a favourable Congress, will probably seek 
                                                     
1 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/magazine/hillary-clinton-campaign-final-weeks.html  
2 http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-makes-his-case-in-
pittsburgh/501335/  
3 See also http://thehill.com/regulation/305673-14-obama-regs-trump-could-undo  
S 
2 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
to weaken or neutralise the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). During the campaign 
Trump observed that “repealing Obamacare and stopping Hillary’s health care takeover is one 
of the single most important reasons that we must win on November 8”.4 In reality, repealing 
the ACA might prove challenging and unpopular as many people (an estimated 22 million) 
would lose health insurance.5 Several names have been circulated concerning possible 
appointees in leading positions in charge of the healthcare portfolio: from Ben Carson to Newt 
Gingrich, from Rich Bagger to Chris Christie; the prospects for ACA are bleak at best.  
Moreover, Trump will most likely challenge and weaken environmental legislation such as 
the Clean Power Plan and reduce the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency, often 
accused of being a regulatory machine that creates too much red tape for businesses. The 
names that circulate for possible appointees to key administration positions, such as Myron 
Ebell and Forrest Lucas, do not look very reassuring for the future of the EPA and all those 
who care about a strong environmental policy.6 Ebell was described as a climate “denier-in-
chief”, just like the President-elect;7 and Lucas, Interior Secretary in pectore, is nothing less than 
a seasoned oil businessman. In that context, Trump might also consider pulling the US out of 
the COP21 Paris Agreement, however controversial, counterproductive and difficult this 
move would be.8 Trump can also be expected to preserve or reinvigorate fossil fuel subsidies, 
endorse fracking and accelerate the extraction of those non-renewable energy resources that, 
sustainability experts claim, should rather remain buried in the ground. On a related issue, 
Trump’s speeches in places like Jonestown, PA (October 21) suggest that industrial policy may 
be revived to protect the steel industry from the allegedly pernicious and unfair competitive 
pressure exerted by the Chinese and also the European steel. But while energy-hungry 
industries may be offered relief from red tape and regulatory constraints, their workers are 
equally likely to see their wages remain low and their overtime pay curbed.9  
Another likely candidate for partial repeal is the Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and was often targeted by the Republican party as a 
source of red tape and considered by the Trump campaign as a sprawling and complex piece 
of legislation that has unleashed hundreds of new rules and several new bureaucratic 
agencies”.10 However, complete repeal of this legislation will be not only difficult, but also 
extremely costly, as many financial institutions would see the compliance costs they already 
                                                     
4 However, after his first conversation with Barack Obama, Donald Trump already showed a much 
softer view of Obamacare (http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-willing-to-keep-parts-of-
health-law-1478895339).  
5 See http://www.vox.com/2016/11/9/13487772/trump-obamacare-repeal; and 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/new-obamacare-sign-ups-trump-victory-231189  





9 Trump has anticipated his will to rollback legislation on increased overtime pay for low wage workers 
(Corkery for the NYT). (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/business/dealbook/trump-expected-
to-seek-deep-cuts-in-business-regulations.html?_r=0). 
10 The Trump website discusses the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, and how the Trump administration 
will work to replace it. See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-doddfrank-
idUSKBN1361X0.   
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faced transform into sunk costs, which would prove impossible to recover. Rather than 
shooting so high, the Trump administration might decide to focus on the details. But the 
Volcker rule and some of the most far-reaching consumer protection rules, including some of 
the powers granted to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), are definitely in first 
row for repeal. This, in turn, might bring US financial regulation back into a situation in which 
banks are allowed to take more risks, just as they were before 2008.11    
The Trump administration will also most likely make a swift U-turn on net neutrality and the 
2015 Open Internet Order, by removing internet services from Title II of the 
Telecommunications Act and weakening the competence of the FCC (Federal 
Communications Commission) on this aspect. And while many economists would see this as 
an efficient move, it is unclear what the alternative will look like, and what other rules will be 
introduced to ensure that end users are empowered and protected when using the internet.12 
Similarly, and more generally, the approach to large mergers and single-firm conduct might 
become even lighter than it has been in the past eight years, and closer to the fiercely criticised 
Department of Justice paper on Single-Firm Conduct published in 2008 at the end of the 
George W. Bush mandate.13  
Apart from these obvious candidates, there is reason to expect the whole regulatory apparatus 
of the United States to be severely affected by the new administration. With 4,000 
administrative positions to fill in America’s well-consolidated spoils system, there is reason to 
expect subtler, but equally profound changes in the way the US administration will approach 
regulation in future. Possible changes include: the strengthening of the ‘adversarial’ role of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which might be given a stronger 
mandate to fight red tape;14 the revision of the existing guidance on cost-benefit analysis, in 
particular concerning the monetisation of benefits from ‘lifesaving’ regulation (the so-called 
value of a statistical life, or VSL), in a way that would make ambitious health, safety and 
environmental regulation less likely to pass the ex-ante regulatory impact analysis (RIA); the 
extension of the obligation to carry out ex-ante RIA to independent agencies; the introduction 
of strict regulatory budgets inspired by European models such as the Dutch-originated 
Standard Cost Model, and possibly coupled with UK-inspired ‘one in, two out’ rules;15 and the 
                                                     
11 See, for a description of how private regulation was dominating the financial services sector before 
the financial crisis, Edward Balleisen and Marc Allen Eisner, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-
Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose” in David A. Moss 
and John Cisternino (eds), New Perspectives on Regulation, Cambridge: The Tobin Project, 2009, 127-150. 
12 For a discussion, see A. Renda and C.S. Yoo, “Telecommunications and Internet Services: The digital 
side of the TTIP”, in Jacques Pelkmans and Daniel S. Hamilton (eds), Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? 
Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Brussels and London: CEPS and Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2015. 
13 See https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/public-hearings-single-firm-conduct-and-antitrust-law for 
the DOJ report, and the press release that announced its repeal.  
14 On the adversarial gatekeeper role of OIRA, see inter alia, Andrea Renda, Law and Economics in the 
RIA World, Intersentia, Amsterdam, 2011 and Jonathan B. Wiener and Alberto Alemanno, “Comparing 
Regulatory Oversight Bodies in the US and EU: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the 
US and the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in the EU” in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter Lindseth (eds), 
Comparative Administrative Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2nd ed., 2016. 
15 See the UK Government’s Better Regulation Framework Manual, adopted in March 2015 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468831/bis-13-
1038-Better-regulation-framework-manual.pdf). For a discussion of the Standard Cost Model, see Renda 
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promotion of red-tape-dominated retrospective reviews of clusters of regulations, or entire 
economic sectors (in what would be an even more cost-focused version of REFIT and 
cumulative cost assessments carried out by the European Commission). These changes are 
even more likely to frustrate efforts to protect health, safety and the environment than the 
repeal of important pieces of primary legislation.  
Much in the same vein, recent attempts to use stringent and well-timed regulation to foster 
innovation are unlikely to be observed in the coming years, marking a difference, inter alia, 
with Europe’s current approach to “better regulation for innovation-driven investment”.16 The 
same could apply to ‘nudging’ regulatory approaches that have been experimented with (with 
mixed results) by OIRA Chairmen Cass Sunstein and Howard Shelanski over the past eight 
years, and which led to the creation of a Social and Behavioral Science Team in the US 
administration, as well as the adoption of an Executive Order in September 2015, aimed at 
promoting the use of behavioural economics by federal agencies. The idea that certain kinds 
of behaviour and especially consumer decisions can be ‘steered’ through the use of selected 
architecture methods, such as anchoring and framing, or a proactive use of default rules, is 
likely to be badly received by the Trump administration. 
There is certainly a lot more to be expected, especially on science and innovation policy (where 
Trump’s denial of climate change leaves many sceptics on his science orientation), industrial 
policy, welfare policies, tax policy, immigration policy and security policy. In particular, there 
is reason to expect a large infrastructure investment plan that will mobilise steel, aluminium 
and possibly jobs on new assets and networks that are however unlikely to include the 
announced wall at the border with Mexico. The president-elect raised expectations by 
announcing an infrastructure jobs bill which will “fix our inner cities and rebuild our 
highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, schools, hospitals” and at the same time put “millions of 
our people to work as we rebuild it.”17 Rumours also have it that one of the key instruments 
the administration will rely on are tax credits for investors, who will then “build, own and 
operate” the infrastructure by recovering their investment through usage fees.  
And there are, of course, much more important question marks on how the new 
administration will fare when it comes to jobs and inequality, especially as restoring America’s 
jobs has emerged as one of the key winning messages of Trump’s campaign: evidence shows 
that counties with prevalence of routine jobs (and thus more at risk of automation) massively 
voted for Trump.18 But the announced supply-side, ‘trickle-down’ economics is empirically 
proven to be incapable of addressing rising inequality and declining living standards. From 
the IMF to Pope Francis, from George H.W. Bush to the OECD, this theory has been soundly 
                                                     
et al., “Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Regulation”, study for the European Commission, 2013 
(http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/131210_cba_study_sg_final.pdf).  
16 See European Commission Communication, “Better Regulation for Innovation-Driven Investment at 
the EU level”, 2016 (https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-
union/pdf/innovrefit_staff_working_document.pdf).   
17 See Trump’s victory speech (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-speech-
transcript.html?_r=0).  
18 See Jed Kolko, “Trump was Stronger Where the Economy is Weaker”, Project 538 
(http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-was-stronger-where-the-economy-is-weaker/).   
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discredited at the global level.19 And the problem is exacerbated by the fact that innovation in 
many sectors is likely to continue creating jobs linearly, while destroying them exponentially. 
Once the ‘privately-run’ infrastructure project will have run its course, the problem of how to 
re-launch industrial America by promoting productivity and maintaining jobs in place will 
still be there. Smart manufacturing, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, the data-
driven economy and the collaborative economy all create concerns and challenges for both 
education and innovation policy: the Trump campaign has offered no detailed plan on 
innovation and technology; no position on whether the US should be attracting highly skilled 
talent from abroad and no specific plan on STEM education, or on all other competences that 
are, and will continue to be, in high demand in the coming years.20  
Finally, and inevitably, the new administration may mark a significant departure from the 
previous one in terms of civil rights. Here, the fact that Trump will have a chance to nominate 
the successor to Antonin Scalia on the Supreme Court might not lead to immediate, dramatic 
changes in the overall balance of the Court, but the new president might get the chance to 
nominate a few more Supreme Court justices in the next four years, and this might end up 
fundamentally altering the Court’s orientation on a number of key civil rights and home affairs 
issues, including the future of the Second Amendment, the rights of minorities (starting with 
Muslims, of course), the LGBT community, gender-related issues, etc.21 The concern becomes 
even greater if one observes that Chief Justice Roberts, himself a moderate conservative, has 
been on the dissenting side of many recent Supreme Court landmark decisions on such issues 
as same-sex marriage and abortion.22 As this contribution is mostly focused on regulatory and 
economic policy issues, it will suffice to remind readers that such prospects are also 
fundamental for issues such as freedom of expression and media pluralism, let alone data 
protection.  
                                                     
19 See the IMF report by Era Dabla-Norris, Kalpana Kochhar, Nujin Suphaphiphat, Frantisek Ricka, and 
Evridiki Tsounta (2015), “Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality : A Global Perspective”, Staff 
Discussion Notes No. 15/13, Washington, D.C., 2015 In 2013 Pope Francis referred to trickle-down 
theories (plural) in his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, at statement n. 54 (…some people 
continue to defend trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free 
market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness in the world … This 
opinion, which has never been confirmed by the facts, expresses a crude and naïve trust in the goodness 
of those wielding economic power and in the sacralized workings of the prevailing economic system. 
Meanwhile, the excluded are still waiting”. George H.W. Bush has famously derided trickle-down 
economics as “voodoo economics” during his failed bid for the 1980 Republican presidential 
nomination. The OECD condemnation of trickle-down economics is found in several recent 
publications, including OECD, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
2015 (DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235120-en). 
20 See inter alia Andrea Renda, “Selecting and Designing European ICT Innovation Policies”, report for 
the European Commission, Joint Research Centre and Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, 
November 2016. 
21 http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/11/nominator-chief  
22 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-274_p8k0.pdf; and 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf  
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Abroad: Autarchy and macho-man politics 
Since this paper mostly focuses on economic and regulatory policy, I will be rather brief on 
foreign policy issues (on which, for first impressions, see Gros & Blockmans, 2016). But at the 
intersection between economic policy and foreign policy lies a number of extremely topical 
issues, which deserve being mentioned in this context. I will limit myself to these. 
First, concerns trade policy, the president-elect has been quite clear in expressing the need to 
fundamentally renegotiate the NAFTA agreement, mostly to avoid that businesses relocate 
outside the US to Mexico in search of cheaper labour. This should happen after the creation of 
a one-stop-shop for trade negotiations located inside the Department of Commerce (a so-called 
“American desk”), with the mission to protect the economic interests of the American worker, 
and the national interests of the United States. Given Trump’s stated intention to crack down 
on the eleven million illegal migrants that currently keep US industry alive in many states, this 
renegotiation might emerge as a clear priority as the cost of labour might eventually rise in the 
US.23 More generally, the future of TPP and even more the TTIP was already uncertain before 
the elections, and appears doomed today. TPP has been signed in Atlanta this year but is 
pending US formal approval, and Trump called it a “terrible deal”.24 The consequences of 
terminating TPP might be significant for the US presence in South-East Asia, where China has 
organised a reaction to TPP by setting up new regional agreements such as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).25 In addition, many important provisions 
included in the TPP will be lost. On the other hand, the TTIP has never landed and is heavily 
contested also in Brussels, which makes it even more complicated for the two blocs to sit down 
further: here, it will be important to see if Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Cooperation will continue 
beyond TTIP, and how. Moreover, Trump will probably make a more proactive use of trade 
policy to take on China, whom he describes as a currency manipulator and a jobs thief. While 
many academics and experts, mostly for sustainability purposes, have advocated a reform of 
WTO rules, their reasons are very different from Trump’s.26 In other words, imposing border 
control measures on Chinese imports, inter alia, to account for their often-greater embedded 
emissions might occasionally serve Trump’s protectionist purposes as well as scholars’ 
                                                     
23 http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-thorny-economics-of-illegal-immigration-1454984443  
24 http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-is-upset-1447374770  
25 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/business/economy/donald-trump-trade-tpp-trans-pacific-
partnership.html. The China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership includes China, Japan 
and 14 other Asian countries and excludes the United States. 
26 See, inter alia, S. Charnovitz, “Green Subsidies and the WTO”, Law School Public Law and Legal 
Theory Paper No. 2014-51, 2014; M. Condon and A. Ignaciuk, “Border Carbon Adjustment and 
International Trade: A Literature Review”, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers No. 2013-
06, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2013 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3xn25b386c-en); C. Fischer (2015), 
“Chapter 21: Options for Avoiding Carbon Leakage”, in Barrett, S. et al. (eds), Towards an Effective and 
Sustainable Climate Regime, CEPR Press and Ferdi, 2015; Mavroidis, P. and J. de Mello, “Chapter 16: 
Climate Change Policies and the WTO: Greening the GAAT, revisited”, in Barrett et al. (2015), Towards 
an Effective and Sustainable Climate Regime, CEPR Press and Ferdi, 2015; M. Wu and J. Salzman, “The 
Next Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy”, Northwestern 
University Law Review, 2014, 108: 401; and ETC (Energy Transition Commission), “Shaping Energy 
Transitions”, Position Paper, April 2016. 
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environmental sustainability concerns, but this will only be a very occasional meeting of the 
minds. 
Second, as already mentioned, rumours have it that the Trump administration will at least 
slow down the US commitment towards the COP21 Agreement, which the Obama 
administration already ratified in a rare idyllic moment with Chinese President Xi Jinping, on 
the eve of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, in September 2016. While completely abandoning 
COP21 might be difficult both legally and politically, there is no doubt that an ambitious 
decarbonisation strategy is at odds with the protectionist, job-restoring messages Trump has 
disseminated through the Rust Belt during his campaign.  
Another field in which global dialogue is likely to face new problems is Internet governance. 
In September this year, the Trump campaign clearly stated that the president-elect “is 
committed to preserving Internet freedom for the American people and citizens all over the 
world”, and that “the US should not turn control of the Internet over to the United Nations 
and the international community”.27 The so-called IANA transition, the result of several years 
of global debate and dialogue, was recently challenged in a lawsuit brought by four 
conservative states (Arizona, Texas, Oklahoma and Nevada) seeking to block the US 
government’s contract with ICANN for IANA functions from expiring. And the new 
administration might support these initiatives to avoid relinquishing control of key internet 
resources to countries that it does not fully trust, despite the fact that the majority of internet 
users are located outside the US and specifically in Asia.  
There are, of course, many other possible consequences of the US elections for the rest of the 
world. Mr Trump announced his intention to substantially reduce the US contribution to 
NATO, to urge that large European countries like Germany increase their own contribution. 
This might become a game changer for the future balance between the US and Russia, their 
influence on Western and Eastern Europe and the overall stability of those regions. A tougher 
stance on migration might have important consequences for refugees, since resettlement 
admissions are determined every year by the President: Trump mentioned the intention to 
suspend admissions of refugees from places where “adequate screening cannot occur”, 
including Syria and Libya. In addition, his characterisation of the Muslim communities and 
his proposed ban on Muslim entry in the US “until our country's representatives can figure 
out what is going on” is unlikely to improve social cohesion domestically, as well as global 
peace.  
Even more generally, it does not take long to realise that the Trump agenda will not be aligned 
with many of the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by 193 countries (including, of 
course, the US) in September 2015. Some of them will be explicitly opposed (climate action, 
affordable and clean energy); others might be gradually swept under the carpet (gender 
equality; life below water; life on land; peace, justice and strong institutions; responsible 
production and consumption); and yet others might still be in Trump’s radar, but will be 
difficult to achieve with his policies (reduced inequalities; decent work and economic growth). 
                                                     
27 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-opposes-president-obama-plan-
to-surrender-american-internet  
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Europe after Brexit and Trump: Make it, or break it 
Against this background, European countries are likely to be severely affected by the election 
of Mr. Trump, for many reasons. First, as observed by Daniel Gros and Steven Blockmans, 
Europe is more exposed to trade than the United States and it might suffer more from a 
slowdown or even a halt in trade negotiations, leading to a resurgence of protectionism.28 
Second, Europe’s commitment to sustainable development, including decarbonisation, will 
remain an orphan of a superpower that was finally moving away from a tradition of denial. 
Third, regulatory and technological cooperation might slow down, with the end of the TTIP 
leaving uncertainty as regards the future of transatlantic relations. Fourth, reduced 
contributions to NATO will lead to pressures for increased defence budgets in many already 
over-indebted EU member states.  
But most importantly, the EU will suffer politically, as Trump’s victory could provide further 
impetus to emerging populist movements in many European countries, especially the ones 
facing elections in 2017. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, Geert Wilders hailed 
Trump’s victory as a second American Revolution; Marine le Pen saw in the election the 
“emergence of a new world”;29 AfD leader Frauke Petry congratulated Trump on Twitter, 
calling his victory a “fresh start” and “historic”; Hungary’s president Viktor Orban 
enthusiastically announced that “democracy is still alive”; and Heinz-Christian Strache, Beppe 
Grillo, Matteo Salvini, the leaders of Golden Dawn and UKIP, all echoed this same sentiment. 
Conversely, EU leaders have made what seems like a rather desperate attempt to revive TTIP 
talks by immediately inviting Trump to Europe for an EU-US Summit at his “earliest 
convenience”.30 But at the same time, Juncker publicly stated that “the election of Trump poses 
the risk of upsetting intercontinental relations in their foundation and in their structure”.31 He 
is probably aware that the big wave of elections in late 2016 and 2017 – involving Bulgaria and 
Austria before the end of the year, and then in 2017 the Netherlands, France, Germany, the 
Czech Republic, and also possibly Denmark, Spain and Italy – could mean the end of the 
European Union as we know it; and that the choice is now whether to find a way to strengthen 
the EU project, or face its swift decline.  
All in all, while Trump’s trickle-down economics are likely to prove ineffective and harmful 
to the US economy in the next few years, the worst effects are more likely to materialise in the 
areas of global governance and security, and even more for the stability and future of specific 
areas like Europe and the Middle East. The magnitude of these ‘negative externalities’ will 
become clearer as Trump’s policy plans as well as his government team are unveiled over the 
coming weeks.32 We will then learn if the distance between taking him “literally”, as opposed 
to “seriously”, was really so large. Meanwhile, as some commentators add one more item to 
                                                     
28 See Daniel Gros and Steven Blockmans (2016), “Trump’s election foreshadows further divisions in 





31 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-eu-juncker-idUSKBN136250  
32 http://www.latercera.com/noticia/moises-naim-la-falta-equipo-desafio-mas-relevante-trump/  
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the list of global existential threats,33 it will be important that academics, experts, politicians 
and the media realise that their role in designing and communicating policy has become more 
important than ever, and that leaders in crucial roles like the President of the United States are 
held fully accountable for the decisions they take, as well as for their impact on the global 
community.  
Concluding remarks: Berlusconi on steroids? 
Can Trump fundamentally change or slow down the global debate on building a sustainable 
future for our planet? Can he significantly alter the balance and dynamics of global trade? Can 
he erase years of patiently fought battles for putting an end to centuries of gender, race and 
sexual discrimination in the US and abroad? Can he pave the way for an even less stable and 
secure global order?  
Yes he can. He faces a few years of very strong power at home, thanks to a favourable 
Congress, a massive spoils system and the prospect of electing up to four Supreme Court 
judges in his first four-year term. He, as have all American Presidents, will enjoy wide 
discretion in foreign policy. And he will certainly be tempted to act swiftly to destroy all the 
bridges that the Obama administration has, perhaps too cautiously, tried to build with other 
superpowers; and to reboot the role of the US in the world, no matter the consequences.   
As a closing note, as an Italian researcher living between the United States and Brussels, I 
cannot avoid the rather straightforward parallelism that is being drawn between Trump and 
Silvio Berlusconi, who governed Italy for almost two decades with few interruptions from 
1994 until late 2011. Two decades in which the narcissistic and self-motivated Italian media 
tycoon, surrounded by early adepts and conservative politicians, swiftly turned into yes-men, 
supplied Italians with a heavy dose of trickle-down economics to be implemented by an 
outsider, pragmatic businessman who supposedly knew how to “get things done”. He 
managed to reduce (!) labour and total factor productivity in the country. He accumulated a 
gigantic public debt with no sign of meaningful public or private investment. He 
impoverished the country compared to other industrialised and emerging economies.34 He led 
unemployment to skyrocket despite tax cuts on the wealthiest. He deteriorated the political 
arena and weakened all right-wing parties in the country (including his own). He frustrated 
social cohesion and nurtured a brutally divisive political debate. He relentlessly shied away 
from evidence-based policy, and engaged in an endless battle with judges, which he as Italian 
Prime Minister could not directly elect or disqualify. He repeatedly displayed ineptitude and 
awkwardness in international contexts. He repeatedly lied, showing incompatibility with 
public decency and a devilish aptitude at manipulating evidence. He blamed, needless to say, 
the opposition and the euro for everything that went badly during his terms in office. And 
finally, and perhaps most worryingly, he left office as the last democratically-elected Italian 
head of government, leaving the country prey, still today, to his legacy and terrified by the 
prospect of casting the ballot again.35  
                                                     
33 http://time.com/4560742/donald-trump-existential-threat/  
34 http://voxeu.org/article/productivity-italy-great-unlearning  
35 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-end-of-bunga-bunga/2015/08/13/a97a9b12-
2662-11e5-b77f-eb13a215f593_story.html 
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Now, the question is: What if Berlusconi had been head of state in a presidential democracy, 
with possibly weaker checks and balances than the ones provided by the (current) Italian 
constitutional system, a more comprehensive spoils system and the ability to name Supreme 
Court judges for approval by a supportive assembly? Even ignoring nuclear weapons for a 
second, the prospect remains frightening. In the next four years, Trump can do no less harm 
than Berlusconi did, and possibly a lot more. The hope is that he eventually won’t. Sometimes 
narcissism makes miracles, but a massive dose of careful and attentive monitoring, in 
combination with resistance where needed, by political parties, civil society, academics, 
intellectuals and foreign governments is going to be the most powerful antidote to such a 
scary, poisonous scenario. 
